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Abstract
The creeping stock market collapse eroded the wealth of funded pen-
sion systems. This led to political tensions between generations due to the
fuzzy definition of property rights on the pension funds wealth. We argue
that this problem can best be resolved by the introduction of generational
accounts. Using modern portfolio and consumption planning theory we
show that the younger generations should have the higher equity expo-
sure due to their human capital. Capital losses should be distributed
smoothly over lifetime consumption. When stock markets are depressed
equity should be bought, savings and consumption should be scaled down
equiproportionally, and retirement should be postponed. Portfolio invest-
ment restrictions are quite costly.
1 Introduction
Many OECD country’s pension systems are currently in a state of crisis. The
creeping stock market collapse has eroded the wealth of funded pension systems.
The apparent opulence of the funded pensions due to the stock market increases
in the nineties lead to demands from politicians and CEO’s to cream skim
the pension funds. As a result, many funds gave away pension holidays to
deliver for some of the company’s stakeholders. As a consequence, many funds
∗We are grateful to stimulating suggestions by Lans Bovenberg and Frank de Jong.
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are still trying to cope with the subsequent stock market decline. Some funds
currently no longer guarantee the defined benefits. Many funds have temporarily
stopped to index the pensions and premia have shot up. Who should pay for
the losses due to the stock market decline: Current retirees, workers or unborn
generations?
We analyze the situation using modern portfolio theory as presented in
Bodie, Merton and Samuelson (1992). This literature shows that the younger
generations should have a higher equity exposure than the older generations due
to the fact that the younger have a higher stock of human capital. Our focus
is different, however, and looks at the implications for pension systems. One
finds that capital market losses should be distributed smoothly over lifetime
consumption and saving, with similar implications for longevity shocks. When
stock markets are depressed equity should be bought, savings and consumption
should be scaled down equiproportionally, and retirement should be postponed.
To enable pension funds and society to achieve these optimal lifetime consumption-
saving patterns, we argue that two elements are crucial. One is the more obvi-
ous requirement that the pension system should operate on a funded basis. The
other less obvious requirement, witness the prevalence of pension funds with
diffuse stakeholder influence, is to clearly define the property rights of each gen-
eration on the pension fund’s wealth, so that political decision making on the
distribution of losses can be avoided. This paper makes a plea for the application
of a system of generational accounts for pension funds, similar to Auerbach and
Kotlikof’s (1987) idea for the public sector. All premiums paid by one genera-
tion should be administered in a separate account. Also, the fund’s investments
must be separately administered, so that each generation’s property rights on
the investment returns are clearly defined.
Keeping separate track of each generation’s investment is crucial, as the
risk profile of optimal investment policies differs between generations. This en-
sures optimal intertemporal smoothing behavior, and introduces an important
automatic macro economic stabilizer. That is, for a capital loss, the percent-
age point increase in the pension premium should be equal to the percentage
decrease in expected pensions after the date of retirement, or equivalently, all
planned future consumption is reduced by the same percentage. Another im-
portant adjustment and smoothing device is to delay the retirement age. Other
systems like the defined benefit system or pay-as you-go system inefficiently
put the whole burden of adjustment on the current working generation, thereby
stimulating the boom bust cycle. We calculate that the optimal decrease in
consumption due to the fall in stock prices in 2001-2002 the period is about
11%. By definition, generational accounts exploit intra-generational solidarity,
just like life insurance policies do in the market place and do not bank on infea-
sible inter-generational solidarity. Nevertheless it is of interest to discuss a mild
form of intergenerational solidarity where society invests in stocks on behalf of
future generations. It is shown to be indeed optimal that young generations
are exposed to stock market uncertainty even before their entry on the labor
market. We discuss the adverse selection problems that come with this type of
policy. We also discuss a simple response to resolve capital losses without need
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of generational solidarity, which is to allow for a flexible retirement age.
Pension funds require public supervision regarding their operations. How-
ever, supervision should not impose restrictions on the funds’ investment poli-
cies, such as that all equity investment should be with EU companies, as was
suggested by several EU member states, or that pension funds should not be
allowed to invest in stocks at all, popular advice in depressed equity markets.
We calculate the cost of the latter restriction, that a fund would only be allowed
to hold an all bond portfolio. We calculate that real labor income should go up
permanently by at least 12% to offset the negative effect on expected utility.
The following section lays out the assumptions of the model that we apply
throughout this paper. In the subsequent sections, we work through all topics
that are raised in this introduction.
2 The model of portfolio selection
To derive portfolio rules for funded systems we build on the literature which
started with Merton’s (1969) and Samuelson’s (1969) analyses of lifetime port-
folio selection for an individual. More recently this literature has been extended
in labor economics by investigating the expected benefits from human capital
and by modeling the uncertainty regarding future wage income, see Bodie, Mer-
ton and Samuelson (1992) and more recently Menoncin (2003). We take into
account the anticipated returns on human capital on the optimal composition
of portfolio. For our purposes it suffices to take labor income for certain and we
assume labor supply to be fixed. Our focus and contribution is with regard to
the implications one can derive from this framework for funded pension plans.
Let t denote the age of the individual. Individuals work from t = 0 till a fixed
retirement age t = T and live on a pension from t = T till their determinate
death at t = D. For simplicity, we ignore any other uncertainty than the return
on investment. Furthermore, we assume that labor income while working is
constant, and we normalize it to unity. Individuals have a Constant Relative
Risk Aversion (CRRA) utility function. Since the labor supply and retirement
decision are exogenous in our analysis, we neglect any disutility of working.
Hence, consumption is the only argument of the utility function:
U (t) ≡
Z D
t
e−β(s−t)u [C (s)] ds (1)
u (C) ≡ 1
1− θC
1−θ,
where U (t) is lifetime utility at age t conditional on the path of consumption
C (s) during the rest of the individual’s life; u (C) is the individual’s instanta-
neous utility, where θ is the coefficient of relative risk aversion; β is the subjective
discount rate.
In order to finance her consumption while retired, an individual saves labor
income. She has two options for investment: A risk free bond with a return ρ,
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or risky equity with price P (t). Suppose the logP (t) evolves according to a
random walk with drift µ and normally distributed innovations with variance
σ2dt. Thus the price of the risky asset follows a geometric Brownian motion:
dP (t) = µ¯P (t)dt+ σP (t)dW (t),
where µ¯ ≡ µ + 12σ2 is the expected return on the equity (the factor σ2/2 is a
consequence of Ito’s lemma or alternatively follows from the mean of a lognormal
distribution), and W (t) is a Wiener process. We assume that there is a trade
off between return and risk: µ¯ > ρ.
Let S(t) be the wealth of the individual and let f (t) be the fraction of her
savings that the individual is willing to invest on the stock market. Then, the
law of motion of savings for a working individual reads:
dS(t) = [f (t) µ¯+ {1− f (t)} ρ]S (t) dt+ [Y (t)− C (t)]dt (2)
+σf (t)S(t)dW (t),
where Y (t) denotes labor income; Y (t) = 1 while working until the time of
retirement T , while Y (t) = 0 from retirement T until death at time D. The
first term on right hand side is the expected return on investment, the second
term is the change in wealth due to saving or dissaving, and the final term
reflects the volatility of stock prices. The budget constraint of the individual
can be written as an initial and a terminal condition on S (t):
S (0) = 0, S (D) ≥ 0.
Individuals start working without any wealth and are not allowed to die in debt.
From the literature we calibrate the parameters of the model. We choose an
active working life T of forty years and fifteen years of retirement, D− T = 15.
The coefficient of relative risk aversion θ plays a crucial role in our analysis.
Experimental economics, see e.g. evidence in Newbery and Stiglitz (1981, ch.7),
and real life experiments such as reported in Beetsma and Schotman (2001)
suggest values between one (logarithmic) and ten. Indirect evidence on the
attitudes towards risk from the equity premium literature such as presented in
Campbell’s review (1999) yield less precise estimates.1 The real business cycle
literature typically experiments with the values in the range between one and
ten, see e.g. Cooley and Prescott (1995), Rouwenhorst (1995) and Backus et
al. (1995). We benchmark our calculations using θ = 10. The value of the rate
of time preference β is set at two percent per year, which is a fair compromise
between Cooley and Prescott (1995), Rouwenhorst (1995) and Backus et al.
(1995). From Campbell’s review and on basis of the revealing study by Dimson,
Marsh, and Staunton (2002) providing the long run statistical properties of
different countries’ asset market performances, we set the return on riskless
bonds ρ equal to 2%, the drift in equity µ is calibrated to 6% and the standard
deviation of equity returns σ is taken equal to 20% per year, so that equity has
an expected return of 8%.
1For example, Table 5 from Campbell for eleven countries implies estimates that range
from minus 295 to plus 7215 (with mean value 1010, standard error of the mean 662, and a
standard deviation of 2198).
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Table 1: Parameter Calibration
Population Parameters
T 40 retirement age
D 55 time of death
Preference Parameters
θ 10 relative risk aversion
β 0.02 time preference
Asset Return Parameters
ρ 0.02 bond return
µ 0.06 drift
σ 0.2 standard deviation
µ¯ 0.08 mean equity return
3 A generation’s optimal policy
The derivation of a generation’s savings and portfolio choice is along the lines of
Bodie et al. (1992) using the continuous time dynamic programming technique.
In Appendix I a detailed derivation is provided. Here we outline the results.
A generation chooses C (t) and f (t) to maximize the expected utility of its
members E
£
U (t)
¤
subject to the dynamic budget constraint (2). Let U (t, S)
denote the optimal expected utility as a function of the state variables of the
system, t and S. The first order conditions for a maximum entail:
C (t) = U−
1
θ
S (3)
f (t) = − µ¯− ρ
σ2
US
SUSS
,
where we suppress the arguments of U for brevity. In the Appendix, we show
that these first order conditions imply:
f (t) = µ¯− ρ
θσ2
S (t) + 1ρ
³
1− e−ρ(T−tˆ)
´
S (t)
, (4)
where tˆ ≡ min (T, t). The second term in the numerator ρ−1
³
1− e−ρ(T−tˆ)
´
, is
a generation’s net discounted value of human capital. Hence, the denominator
is the sum of its financial and human capital, or equivalently, the net discounted
value of all its expected future consumption. The final factor in equation (4) is
therefore the inverse of the ratio of financial to total capital of a generation.
When retired, T ≥ t ≥ D, the human capital is fully depleted and all future
consumption of that generation has to be financed from its is financial capital.
Thus for all T ≥ t ≥ D, the proportion of investment in the risky asset follows
the static mean variance portfolio choice dictum:
f (T ) =
µ¯− ρ
θσ2
.
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It also is the celebrated rule from Merton (1969) and Samuelson (1969) for
dynamic intertemporal asset allocation. The share is increasing in the risk
premium µ¯ − ρ and decreasing in the degree of riskiness of the risky asset σ2
and the coefficient of relative risk aversion θ. During the working life t < T ,
however, when the net discounted value of labor income is still positive, the
share of investment in the risky asset is higher than during retirement. It is
proportional to the inverse of the financial wealth relative to the total wealth
of a generation. This implies that f (t) can even be larger than unity. Hence,
f (t) is not really a share. The higher investment in the risky asset at young
ages fits the layman’s intuition. However, the reason for this investment rule
is not the standard argument that young people face a longer time horizon to
make up for losses in the value of their investment, compare Merton (1969) and
Samuelson (1969) for the refutation of that argument. The real reason is that
when a generation enters the labor market, its financial capital is only a small
part of its total wealth. The largest part is human capital. Thus going short
in bonds while young is not as risky as it appears, since this is counterbalanced
by the stock of human capital. The stock of human capital works like a buffer.
Since human capital is largest when young, a young generation can take on more
risk than an older generation. Hence, the young invest a greater share of their
financial capital in equity. The optimal investment policy is to distribute risk
exposure ”evenly” over the lifetime of a generation. For example, consider two
investment policies: investing 50 Euro in stocks and 50 Euro in bonds during
two years or investing 100 Euro in stocks in the first year and 100 Euro in bonds
during the second year. Though the expected return of both policies is equal
(approximately, we ignore accumulated interests for simplicity), the riskiness
of the second policy is larger. An ”even” distribution of risk exposure over the
lifetime requires the amount of money invested on the stock market to be a fixed
fraction of discounted wealth, or equivalently, the discounted value of expected
future consumption. Hence, since the initial stock of savings is low, the ”share”
of savings invested on the stock market should be high. Using the parameter
values calibrated above, one finds that for the pensioners f (T ) = 0.15. The
sensitivity with respect to the parameter choices is easily investigated, e.g. at
θ = 2 one gets f (T ) = 0.75.
4 High leverage for young generations
Multiplication of equation (4) by S (t) yields an expression for the amount in-
vested in equity, I (t):
I (t) = µ¯− ρ
θσ2
·
S (t) + 1
ρ
³
1− e−ρ(T−tˆ)
´¸
. (5)
The value of investment at the beginning of the working career, I (0), can be
calculated easily, using S (0) = 0. Taking the benchmark parameter values
gives I (0) = 4.13, which means that at beginning of one’s career a generation
should borrow four times one’s yearly wage and invest this in the equity markets.
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Similar numbers can be found in Bodie, Merton, and Samuelson (1992). The in-
vestment in equity has to be financed by simultaneous borrowing of the risk free
asset. This may appear quite high since it is a risky strategy not unlike a highly
leveraged hedge fund. In practice, young persons are credit constrained, so this
strategy may be infeasible2. Nevertheless, one has only to incorporate loans
for college and the mortgages to realize that the leverage (in terms of financial
wealth) of young and middle aged is often quite considerable. In particular, the
investment in housing paid for by mortgages, contributes to efficient risk taking
at younger ages, since house and stock prices are highly correlated. In fact the
young effectively purchase a call option on the macro economic performance of
the economy with their human capital as collateral.
5 Intergenerational solidarity
A frequently raised objection against generational accounts is that these rule
out intergenerational solidarity. Judging by the current political and genera-
tional stalemate in countries like Italy and Germany one can wonder whether
this solidarity is feasible at all. The problem was formally analyzed within an
overlapping generations economy by Hendricks, Judd and Kovenock (1980), who
showed that the core in such models is empty, implying that there is no political
support for intergenerational transfers and taxes. Nevertheless, it is useful to
analyze the physical constraint on intergenerational solidarity.
Intergenerational solidarity is equivalent to spreading the stock market risk
over a longer time period than just a generation’s lifetime. The longer the time
period over which the risk can be spread, the better it can be diversified, and
hence, the lower is standard deviation. A fundamental insight here is that the
opportunities for this diversification are asymmetric. Including uncertainty on
future stock prices in a generation’s portfolio is theoretically impossible. The
information on the realization of Pt becomes available only after the death of
the generation. Hence, it can not adjust its consumption to these realizations.
Contrary to future shocks, including past shocks to stock prices is feasible,
but only under strict conditions. For this type of solidarity to work, a genera-
tion is supposed to have invested in the risky asset before the start of its career.
Instead of a deterministic starting value of its financial capital, S (0) = 0, a
generation borrows to buy stocks at some date t < 0 (at birth, say). Hence,
S (0) is a random variable with a positive expectation due to risk premium on
the investment in equity, µ¯ − ρ > 0. Though the expectation is positive, the
starting value of S (0) will be negative for some realizations. The optimal invest-
ment policy maximizes the expected value of the starting utility, E[U (0, S (0))],
where we take expectations over S (0). This system exposes pension funds to
2Credit constraints may reflect the risk of a fall in stock prices leaving the young with
negative financial wealth. The collateral value of their human capital may then become
distressed since the knowledge that one has to service a high debt for the rest of one’s life,
creates severe moral hazard problems regarding work effort, so that no bank would be prepared
to finance this gearing with no other collateral.
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even stronger adverse selection problems than the high leverage for young gen-
erations considered in the previous section. If stock prices have risen during the
investment period prior to labor market entry, people will love to participate
in the pension fund. However, if stock prices have come down, nobody will
voluntary enter the fund upon entering the labor market. The problem that
the young can walk away, is analogous to the hold up problem in Industrial
Organization. Only government regulation to impose mandatory participation
can solve this problem, if it finds support for such a rule.
Suppose participation can be enforced. Mathematically, the problem of entry
upon birth into the pension scheme is not very different from the standard
problem treated in the previous section. One only has to include an additional
term for the time span between the date of birth, t = −B, and labor market
entry, t = 0. During this period, a generation has no labor income: Y (t) = 0.
For a clean comparison with the case discussed till sofar, we ignore consumption
before labor market entry. The initial condition S (0) = 0 is now replaced by
the condition S (−B) = 0. For the rest, the problem remains exactly the same.
By a similar derivation as before, a generation’s optimal investment in the risky
asset satisfies for −B ≤ t ≤ 0:
I (t) = µ¯− ρ
θσ2
·
S (t) + 1
ρ
¡
1− e−ρT
¢
eρt
¸
,
while equation (5) remains valid for I (t) after the entry on the labor market
at t = 0. For S (t) = 0, the investment in equity is lower at t = −B than
at t = 0, since the net discounted value of labor income is smaller for t < 0.
However, there is still a strong incentive to invest in stocks, showing the value
of diversifying risk to the period before labor market entry.
It may seem an unrealistic idea to let a generation invest in stocks even before
its entry on the labor market. It is therefore important to realize that in the
current systems without generational accounts many pension funds do actually
apply this type of intergenerational solidarity, by levying equal premiums for
all age groups. The fall in stock prices has forced many pension funds to raise
these premia, to compensate for losses in their investment portfolio. Hence, a
new generation entering the labor market right now has to carry part of the
burden of stock market misfortune from past generations.
To break the deadlock between generations, there is another alternative avail-
able which is sort of a go between investments ante a career and spreading the
risk to afterlife. This is the flexible retirement age. With some fortune, a gen-
eration can retire early. But in case of bad luck, an extension of the date of
retirement allows a generation to internalize the hedge against the downside
risk. Consider the effects of extending one’s career. It is immediate that the
share of equity investment for the retired is unaffected. For the active gener-
ations an extension of the retirement age increases the risk taking since from
(4)
∂f (t) /∂T > 0, for t < T.
This effect is similar to the case of labor flexibility treated more formally in
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Bodie et al. (1992), by endogenizing the retirement decision. Moreover, from
(16) in the Appendix one sees that consumption increases as well
∂C (t) /∂T > 0, for t < T.
Thus as a remedy against equity losses an extension of T not only may lessen the
severity of capital losses, it also provides for spreading risk over a longer period
and has macro stabilizing effects, since it boosts current spending. Currently,
many European governments are trying to push this idea as one of the methods
to alleviate the pension problems. Interestingly, the absence of a retirement age
in the US provides this cushion as an automatic stabilizer.
6 The welfare loss of ruling out investment in
stocks
Funded pension plans in The Netherlands and the UK do not operate under
direct portfolio restrictions. Historically this was quite different. For example,
the fund for teachers in Holland is still suffering from the obligation to swallow
all loans placed by the government. France and Spain have recently tried to
limit equity investments of any EU based pension fund to EU stocks, thereby
foregoing the benefits from investment in high growth Asian countries that do
not suffer from the inverted population pyramid. We investigate the social
cost of such type of regulation. Suppose that some legal authority rules out
any investment of pension funds in equity. This rule would restrict the set of
policies available to a generation, and therefore reduce the maximum achievable
expected utility of its members. By how much do we have to increase its labor
income to offset this negative effect? In the Appendix, we derive the following
approximate expression for the required relative wage increase:
1
4
µ
µ¯− ρ
σ
¶2 D
θ
+O
¡
D2
¢
. (6)
For the benchmark parameter values the permanent increase in labor income
needed to offset the loss due to the obligation to invest all wealth in the risk free
asset is 12% (respectively 10% if one uses the exact expression, see equation
(17)). This boils down to almost five years extra work. If the coefficient of
relative risk aversion θ is lowered to two, the welfare loss becomes a staggering
61% (both for the approximation and the exact formula).
These numbers account for only part of the welfare loss due to the obligation
to invest all wealth in the risk free asset. It captures the welfare loss due to
inappropriate restrictions on the supply of risky funds, keeping the risk pre-
mium constant. However, the lower supply of risk bearing funds raises the risk
premium (macro shortage of risk bearing capital), and thereby the cost of not
supplying these funds. Alternatively, the procedure discussed above accounts
for the Harberger triangle on the supply side, not for that on the demand side.
9
7 The consequences of a fall in stock prices
What happens to the distribution of future consumption when stock prices fall,
as happened during the period 2001-2002? Consider equation (5). A fall in
stock prices by one yearly standard deviation σ reduces the total wealth of a
generation, its financial plus its human capital, by:
I (t)σ
S (t) + 1ρ
³
1− e−ρ(T−bt)´ = µ¯− ρθσ = 3%. (7)
The numerator is the loss in the value of savings, which is taken relative to the
total wealth. A one standard deviation fall in stock prices reduces total wealth
by 3%. By the martingale property of stock prices, this fall is expected to be
permanent. Since all future consumption is paid for from this wealth, it has to
decline by 3% on average, too (see the expression (16) for consumption in the
appendix). By the CRRA utility function, this decline should be distributed
equally across all periods. Hence, future pensions are reduced by 3%. The rate
of saving (or equivalently: pension premium rate) is increased by 3% point.
Note that this expression does not depend on the age of a generation t. Due
to the optimal investment policy, a fall in stock prices has the same effect on
consumption per period for all generations, whether the shock occurs at the
start of the career, or just before dieing. Equation (7) implies that the premium
rate for each generation follows a random walk. This random walk is the same
for all generations, so that the premium rates for each generation move parallel
across time. The premium rate upon labor market entry starts at the same level
for each generation. Current premium rates differ across generations, though,
because each generation has been exposed to a different part of the trajectory
of the random walk due to entering the labor market at different points in time.
The holding of equity indeed carries quite some risk. Over a lifetime career
equation (7) implies that the standard deviation of the premium rate is as large
as
µ¯− ρ
θσ
√
T = 19%.
But note that the total expected extra return is also a sizable eleven-, i.e.
exp(0.0 6∗40) ≈ 11, fold increase of an initial investment. We can also use equa-
tion (7) to calculate the consequences for consumption of the fall in stock prices
in the period 2001-2002. Stock prices were approximately halved, which is a de-
cline of about 70 log points, or a fall of 0.7/σ = 3.5 yearly standard deviations.
Hence, the negative effect on future consumption is a sizeable 3.5×3% = 10.5%.
What is the effect of a fall in stock prices on the portfolio of a generation?
Should it buy or sell stocks? Again, we take for granted our assumptions of a
constant return on the risk free asset, a constant risk premium and a constant
volatility of stock prices, and again, consider equation (5). Since (µ¯−ρ)/(θσ2) <
1, a fall in stock prices Pt reduces the right hand side of this expression less than
it reduces the value of the investment, simply because the investment in equity
is only a fraction of the sum of financial and human capital. Hence, a fall in
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stock prices reduces the value of the investment in equity below the desired level.
This should be offset by buying additional equity. Thus pension funds should
be buying in a falling market. In fact this is what happened in the beginning of
the recent stock market decline, but supervisors aborted this remixing, or even
reversed the process thereby adding to the stock market woes.
The above shows that optimally all generations share when stock markets are
depressed, workers and retired alike. Everybody’s consumption has to be scaled
down by the same percentage, either by higher premiums or by lower pensions.
Per contrast, under defined benefit plans solidarity means that retired persons
receive a steady income stream unrelated to the performance of the economy.
Thus in bad times workers suffer twice, feeding to macro instability.
Lastly, we briefly investigate the ’negative ’ effects of longevity. Consider
the shock of a sudden increase in longevity. Differentiating (4)
∂f (t) /∂D = 0, for t < T
one sees that this does not affect the optimal portfolio mix. One just has to live
longer on the same amount of wealth. Thus it stands to reason that consumption
∂C (t) /∂D < 0, for t < T,
see (16), falls if life expectancy goes up. If D goes up, the policy response
of increasing T discussed in one of the previous sections appears all the more
reasonable.
8 Share of equity for mature pension fund
In the previous sections, we have derived the optimal portfolio for a single gen-
eration. However, a mature pension fund has participants of all generations,
ranging from people who have just started their working career to retirees close
to the age of death. Where pension funds do not keep separate track of each
generation’s account, it might be useful to have some idea whether their share of
total investment held in equity nevertheless satisfies the rules for optimal port-
folio management per generation. That is: if we add up the optimal portfolios
of all generations in the pension fund, what should be the average share of the
fund’s wealth that is invested in equity? Let N (t) be the size of a generation of
age t. Then, the share of investment in stock for the pension funds as a whole,
f∗, satisfies:
f∗ =
RD
0
f (t)S (t)N (t) dtRD
0
S (t)N (t) dt
(8)
=
µ¯− ρ
θσ2
RD
0
h
S (t) + 1ρ
³
1− e−ρ(T−bt)´iN (t) dtRD
0
S (t)N (t) dt
Assume that generations grow at a fixed rate λ, so that the size N (t) of the
current generation of age t is N (0) e−λt. The problem of this expression is that
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we do not have a deterministic expression for S (t), since it depends on past
fortunes on the stock market. Our approach is to assume that the fund has
operated under the portfolio constraint that all investments should be made in
the riskfree asset in the past. Furthermore, suppose that this restriction is lifted
today. Then, how much of its wealth should the pension fund invest in equity?
Such was the situation prevailing till a few years ago for the pension fund of the
Dutch government employees, one of the largest pension funds in the world. In
the Appendix, we show that, as a first order approximation, f∗satisfies:
f∗ ∼=
µ¯− ρ
θσ2
D
D − T (9)
The average ratio of total wealth to savings is approximately equal to total life
time D divided by the length of the retirement period D − T . Note that the
rate of population growth λ is only of second order importance to the value of
f∗. Applying this crude approximation to our benchmark parameters suggests
that a mature pension fund should invest 55% of its wealth in equity. (using
the exact solution (18) from the Appendix, assuming a two percent population
growth, λ = 0.02, yields f∗ = 0.65, while in case of a static population, λ = 0.00,
the values is f∗ = 0.49). Hence, the optimal portfolio rules imply that mature
pension funds should invest quite a substantial part of their wealth in equity.
9 Discussion
Modern portfolio theory implies that the young should have the higher stock
exposure due to their human capital. Capital losses are distributed smoothly
over lifetime consumption. When stock markets are depressed equity should
be bought, savings and consumption should be scaled down equiproportionally,
and retirement should be postponed. These results suggest to introduce funded
pensions cum generational accounts. Generational accounts administered by
pension funds enables society and generations to adhere to the optimal portfo-
lio choice rules. This is beneficial since such behavior smoothens shocks over
time, which inter alia also has a positive effect on the business cycle ampli-
tudes. Generational accounts avoid distribution conflict between generations
that might otherwise arise when the stock market goes down. The implications
are equitable since all generations share in the fortunes of the economy. Gen-
erational accounts do not require the inefficient holding of buffers, and prevent
disputes over their ownership. Buffers are analogous to precautionary saving:
we save more than is required. This makes sense only for uninsurable hazards.
However, for insurable risk, the market provides the cheapest insurance. Since
bonds provide insurance against stock market volatility, precautionary saving is
an inefficient way to insure these risks.3
In the paper we gloss over the uncertainty regarding future labor income.
This uncertainty makes human capital a risky investment. At first sight, one
3For example, the Dutch supervisory authority PVK bases its policy on the notion of
buffers. This required reserve is higher the greater the share a fund has invested in equity.
12
would expect that the optimal response to a greater riskiness of human capital
would reduce the exposure to stock market volatility. However, this is not
necessarily true. In the longer run, the evolution of real wages is correlated to
the evolution of stock prices. Since in practice desired future disposable income
is indexed by future real wages, this correlation reduces the volatility of stock
prices relative to desired consumption. Then, a lower relative volatility raises
the optimal share of wealth to be invested in equity. This conclusion is turned
around when desired future income is indexed by consumption prives. A further
issue along these lines is the endogeneity of the retirement decision which we
briefly dealt with. The flexibility in the retirement age provides an additional
insurance device, as is analyzed extensively in Bodie, Merton, and Samuelson
(1992). When a fall stock prices erodes the value of the financial capital, people
will adjust by postponing their retirement. The availability of this additional
form of insurance induces a higher exposure to stock market volatility.
Finally, the introduction of generation accounts has radical implications for
the governance of pension funds. Currently, many European firms are in trouble
because the new International Accounting Standards requires them to put large
liabilities due to defined benefit pension systems on their balance sheet. Since
by definition the pension funds liabilities to a generation must be paid from the
available wealth on that generation’s account, there can be a clear separation
between the responsibility of the employer and that of the pension fund. The
employer has neither a responsibility nor a say in the pension policies. Pension
liabilities can never pop up on the employer’s balance sheet. The counterpart of
this argument is that pension fund’s wealth is just deferred compensation, owned
by the participants in the fund and not by the employer. Hence, employers
should be removed from the pension fund’s board. This would also facilitate
the free movement of labor across Europe which in part is greatly hampered by
the current differences in pension systems and sunk contributions.
In summary, we believe that generational accounts allow individuals to ben-
efit from optimal investment policies and remedy a number of the current defi-
ciencies in the definition of property rights.
10 Appendix Derivations
10.1 Derivation of equation (3) and (4)
Optimal utility is an implicit function of time and savings. By Ito’s Lemma
dU(t, S) = {US(t, S) ([f (t) µ¯+ (1− f (t)) ρ]S (t) + [Y (t)− C (t)])
+Ut(t, S) + USS(t, S)
1
2
σ2f(t)2S(t)2]}dt
+σf (t)S(t)dW (t), (10)
where subscripts denote partial derivatives. The individual chooses C (t) and
f (t) to maximize her expected utility E [U ] subject to the dynamic budget
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constraint (2). From (1) by differentiation
dU
dt
= −u [C (t)] + βU (t) . (11)
To maximize expected utility, take expectations in equation (10) and substitute
on the left hand side the total differential from (11). This yields:
−u [C(t)] + βU (t, S)
= Ut(t, S) + US(t, S)E[dS (t)] + USS(t, S)
1
2
σ2f(t)2S(t)2.
From (2), we have:
E[dS (t)] = ([f (t) µ¯+ (1− f (t)) ρ]S (t) + [Y (t)− C (t)]) dt.
Rearranging terms, using equation (1) and suppressing reference to the state
variables yields:
βU = 1
1− θC
1−θ + [(fµ¯+ (1− f) ρ)S + Y − C]US +
1
2
σ2f2S2USS +Ut. (12)
Since U is the optimal expected utility, the first order conditions for consumption
and the investment policy require the derivatives of the right hand side with
respect to C and f to be zero. From these first order conditions we obtain (3).
Substitution in equation (12) yields:
βU = −θ
θ − 1U
θ−1
θ
S + (ρS + Y )US −
1
2
µ
µ¯− ρ
σ
¶2 U2S
USS
+ Ut. (13)
This is a partial differential equation. Its solution takes a particular simple form
for a retired person:
U (t, S) = 1
1− θS
1−θg (t) , g (D) = 0.
For working individuals, when Y = 1, the solution is somewhat more compli-
cated:
U (t, S) = 1
1− θ
·
S + 1
ρ
³
1− e−ρ(T−t)
´¸1−θ
g (t) . (14)
The validity of these solutions is checked easily. Twice differentiating equation
(14) and substitution in equation (13) yields a first order differential equation
for g (t):
βg (t) = θg (t)
θ−1
θ − ρ (θ − 1) g (t)− 1
2
θ − 1
θ
µ
µ¯− ρ
σ
¶2
g (t) + gt (t) , g (D) = 0.
(15)
Solving this differential equation and substitution in equation (13) and (14)
yields equation (4).
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10.2 Derivation of equation (6)
Consider the more general case where Y (t) while working is y. Then utility and
consumption satisfy:
U (t, S) = 1
1− θ
·
S + 1
ρ
³
1− e−ρ(T−t)
´
y
¸1−θ · θ
α
³
1− e−αθ (D−t)
´¸θ
C (t) =
S + 1ρ
¡
1− e−ρ(T−t)
¢
y
θ
α
¡
1− e−αθ (D−t)
¢ (16)
α ≡ β + ρ (θ − 1) + 1
2
θ − 1
θ
µ
µ¯− ρ
σ
¶2
see equation (14) and (3). The utility at the beginning of the individual’s career
is U (0, 0). In the absence of a risky asset, this utility is equal to case where the
risk premium is equal to zero, µ¯− ρ = 0, for in that case the optimal policy is
not to invest in stocks, f = 0. Hence, α = β − ρ (1− θ) for that special case.
Take y = 1 and α = β + ρ (θ − 1) + 12
θ−1
θ
¡ µ¯−ρ
σ
¢2
as the benchmark case. Let
y∗ be the labor income that yields the same lifetime utility as the benchmark
case for α = β − ρ (1− θ); y∗ can be solved by setting equal the expressions for
U (0, 0) in the benchmark and in the special case. Some simplification yields:
y∗ =
·
β − ρ (1− θ)
α
µ
1− e−αθD
1− e−β−ρ(1−θ)θ D
¶¸ θ
1−θ
(17)
The relative wage increase needed to offset the utility loss of an obligation not
to invest in equity is (y∗ − 1)/1. A Taylor expansion of y∗ − 1 in D yields (6).
10.3 Derivation of equation (9)
Total future consumption has to be financed from total wealth, hence:
θ
β − (1− θ) ρ
³
e
ρ−β
θ t − e
ρ−β
θ D−ρ(D−t)
´
C (0) =
1
ρ
³
1− e−ρ(T−t)
´
+ S (t)
The initial level of consumption follows from setting t equal to zero, using S (0) =
0:
C (0) = β − (1− θ) ρ
θρ
1− e−ρT
1− e ρ−βθ D−ρD
Hence, the stock of savings at age t satisfies:
S (t) =
1
ρ
³
e
ρ−β
θ t − e
(1−θ)ρ−β
θ D+ρt
´ 1− e−ρT
1− e ρ−βθ D−ρD
− 1
ρ
³
1− e−ρ(T−bt)´
Substitution of these relations in equation (8) yields:
f∗ = µ¯− ρ
θσ2

1−
1−e
ρ−β
θ D−ρD
1−e−ρT
R T
0
¡
e−λt − e−ρT+(ρ−λ)t
¢
dtRD
0
³
e ρ−βθ t−λt − e ρ−βθ D−ρD+(ρ−λ)t
´
dt


−1
(18)
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A Taylor expansion of the integrals yields:Z D
0
³
e
ρ−β
θ t−λt − e
ρ−β
θ D−ρD+(ρ−λ)t
´
dt
=
1
2
ρθ − ρ+ β
θ
µ
D2 − ρθ − 2ρ+ θλ+ 2β
3θ
D3
¶
+O
¡
D4
¢
,
1
1− e−ρT
Z T
0
³
e−λt − e−ρT+(ρ−λ)t
´
dt
=
1
2
T − 1
12
(2λ− ρ)T 2 +O
¡
T 3
¢
,
and
1− e
ρ−β
θ D−ρD
=
µ
ρ− ρ− β
θ
¶
D − 1
2
µ
ρ− ρ− β
θ
¶2
D2 +O
¡
D3
¢
.
Retaining the first two non-zero terms for each expression yields equation (9).
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